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Abstract: If and how the conduct of the banking sector contributes to the propagation of aggregate
shocks has become a prominent empirical research question. This study explores what a cyclicality
analysis of net interest margins and spreads, as well as proﬁtability ﬁgures, can contribute to the
discussion. By using time series data for the Austrian banking sector from 1987 to 2005, it is found
that many of these measures fall in economic upturns. Net interest income from granting loans
and taking deposits from non-banks, however, evolves procyclically and increases with rising interest
rates. Combined with the observation that the margins’ countercyclical variations are rather small, it
can be concluded that there is no striking evidence for a ﬁnancial accelerator caused by the Austrian
banking sector.
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Financial propagation mechanisms for real and monetary aggregate shocks have been extensively
studied in recent years. It has become common sense that ﬁnancial institutions and contracts play
a prominent role in macroeconomic dynamics. For example, the literature on the credit channel
(Bernanke and Gertler 1995) argues that informational frictions and costly enforcement of contracts
create agency problems in ﬁnancial markets which aﬀect the way monetary policy signals are trans-
mitted.
An important part of this literature stresses the“ﬁnancial accelerator”(proposed by Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist 1996), the ampliﬁcation of shocks through endogenous developments in credit
markets. Besides cyclical variations in the availability of (bank) ﬁnance (Hubbard 1995, Bernanke
et al. 1996), endogenous eﬀects on external ﬁnancing conditions are studied. The main factor
examined in this respect is the “external ﬁnance premium” (EFP), the wedge between the cost of
funds raised externally (by issuing equity or debt) and the opportunity cost of funds raised internally
(by retained earnings). As borrowers’ ﬁnancial positions (e.g. balance sheet strength is the key
signal through which the creditworthiness of ﬁrms is evaluated) are procyclical, movements in the
premium for external funds are countercyclical (Mody and Taylor 2004), leading to an ampliﬁcation
of aggregate shocks via borrowers’ spending. While, in principle, such premiums can be considered
for each type of external ﬁnance, the EFP mostly is associated with ﬁnancing conditions on corporate
bonds markets.
From the viewpoint of the banking sector, several measures could be investigated concerning
their cyclical behavior. A bulk of research is devoted to the determinants of interest rate margins
and spreads, but mostly lacks a clear connection to the above-mentioned literature. Whereas the
endogenous variation of price-cost margins in goods markets as a shock-propagation mechanism
has received considerable attention, comparable eﬀorts for banking markups are scarce.1 This is
somewhat surprising, having in mind the enormous relevance of bank ﬁnance and the fact that, for
example, interest spreads are understood as banking markups.2
Most closely connected to the role of cyclicality in bank markups as a shock-propagation
channel is the analysis of Dueker and Thornton (1997). In their model, capital market imperfections
(in combination with risk aversion of the bank management) give rise to a countercyclical bank
markup. Aggregate U.S. interest rate data for the 1973 to 1993 period are applied to test and
conﬁrm their proposition. Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), on the other hand, use regional panel
data for Italy (1984-1997) and ﬁnd that GDP growth is negatively related to the bank margin
(calculated from interest and services income). Aggregate demand or other cyclically varying variables
do appear in several studies of bank margins and spreads (e.g. Corvoisier and Gropp 2002). However,
as these studies mostly conduct panel regressions with yearly data, a thorough analysis of bank
markup cyclicality is unintended and also impractical as short-term cycles are hidden and cross-
country diﬀerences have to be accounted for.
1The literature is extended in this being one of the ﬁrst studies that applies quarterly time series
data from a single country to examine how net interest margins and spreads as well as banking proﬁts
vary over the interest and business cycle. Therefore, the above-mentioned problems with yearly panel
data are precluded. Unlike the single-equation models estimated in many studies, our methodological
framework addresses endogeneity, simultaneity and identiﬁcation issues. Furthermore, it will be shown
that the quality of the conclusions that can be drawn depends crucially on the chosen indicators for
bank behavior. Besides the rather standard division into net interest income and non-interest income,
the net interest income from the business with non-banks (with respect to loans and deposits) and
other sources of interest income and expenses will be further diﬀerentiated.
Austria is a country with strong bank dependence in corporate ﬁnancing and therefore is a
perfect candidate for being examined. Braumann (2004) concludes that state inﬂuence, networks
between banks, the high share of non-proﬁt banks, and the prominent role of banking relationships
led the Austrian banking sector to even contribute to a ﬁnancial decelerator in the past. However,
it is not clear a priori how ex-post bank margins (as a more general measure of bank conduct,
they reﬂect changes prices and volumes of assets and liabilities, as well as balance sheet structure)
will vary over the business cycle and whether their cyclical behavior is consistent with a ﬁnancial
accelerator or decelerator.3 Our results show that most of the examined bank margins, spreads and
proﬁt measures, in fact, temporarily shrink after increases in GDP growth. However, after analyzing
the countercyclicality of margins more deeply, it can be concluded that the evidence in favor of a
ﬁnancial accelerator originating in the Austrian banking sector’s conduct is not strongly convincing.
The rest of the article is organized as follows: A review of the empirical literature on this
topic is outlined in section 2. Section 3 presents details about the data, and section 4 describes the
methods used. Our results are reported in section 5 and section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Literature review
Banks play a crucial role in the operation of most economies, and literature has shown that the
eﬃciency with which banks intermediate capital can aﬀect economic growth (Levine 2005). There-
fore, research on the determinants of the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation (the arrangement between
capital demand and supply, as far as banks are involved) will naturally enter the policy dialogue
(Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt, Laeven and Levine 2004). In empirical analyses, intermediation costs are com-
monly represented by ﬁnancial ratios as the so-called net interest margin, i.e. net interest income as
a share in interest-earning or total assets. Sometimes, interest rate diﬀerentials are used, or standard
operating ﬁgures as the return on assets or equity.4
Bank interest margins and spreads also serve as indicators of the eﬃciency of the banking
system (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga 1999, Drakos 2003)5 and, consequently, are also used for
competition policy evaluation. On the other hand, however, increases in banking competition may
2also weaken ﬁnancial stability (Bikker and Groeneveld 2000, Weill 2004). Due to lower proﬁts and
banks taking more risks, an increase in the probability of bankruptcy may be induced. Saunders
and Schumacher (2000), for example, argue that it is not clear whether high margins are good or
bad from a social welfare perspective. Large margins add to the proﬁtability and capital of banks
so that they can insulate themselves from macroeconomic and other shocks. Angbazo (1997) states
that banks’ margins should generate suﬃcient income to increase the capital base as risk exposure
increases. Nevertheless, there has been surprisingly little interest in examining the cyclicality of banks’
markups.
2.1 Literature on banking markup cyclicality
Dueker and Thornton (1997), for example, study aggregate loan markups in the U.S. banking industry
(from 1973 to 1993). The diﬀerence between the prime lending rate and the rate on 180-day
certiﬁcates of deposit is used to proxy the bank markup. As the data for this is weekly, common
indicators of the cyclical state of the economy do not apply. With the spread (diﬀerence) between
the commercial paper rate and the Treasury bill rate as an alternative measure, they ﬁnd evidence for
the countercyclical behavior of the loan markup. The theoretical reasoning provided by Dueker and
Thornton (1997) for this to emerge consists, on the one hand, of a risk-averse and proﬁt-smoothing
bank management and, secondly, switching costs in the loan market which give banks some market
power over their customers. They conclude that by mitigating these capital market imperfections it
would be possible to attenuate business cycles.
A diﬀerent approach is chosen by Angelini and Cetorelli (2003), who construct yearly panel
data (1984-1997) from income statements and balance sheets of Italian banks for ﬁve geographical
regions. The price-deposit margin they calculate, which includes interest as well as services income, is
negatively related to changes in real GDP growth. Though they also do not directly relate their results
to the discussion of margin cyclicality in banking, the results of Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) point to
countercyclicality as well. Using yearly (1995-1999) interest rate data from 11 euro area countries,
diﬀerences to money market rates for seven diﬀerent banking product categories are constructed.
Their results suggest that higher conﬁdence reduces the gap between money market and deposit
rates as well as the gap between lending and money market rates. There is, admittedly, additional
research on bank margins having real GDP (growth) or other cyclical measures (e.g. credit risk or
loan defaults) among the regressors. As the majority of this is conducted using panel data and does
not draw conclusions on cyclical bank behavior, it is not seen as related work in this respect.
In studying the eﬀects of macroeconomic ﬂuctuations on bank margins and spreads, interest
rate developments should be controlled for in order to business cycle eﬀects not being obscured by
endogenous changes in monetary policy rates. On the other hand, the variation of banking-related
measures over the interest rate cycle is rewarding on its own. Our presumptions follow the observation
from the interest rate transmission literature (e.g. Sander and Kleimeier 2004) that, in periods of
3monetary tightening, interest rates on bank liabilities are more sluggish than those on assets and vice
versa. So, as Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) argue and conﬁrm empirically, increases in short-term
interest rates should lead to rising margins.
2.2 Literature on other determinants of bank margins and spreads
Literature on bank margins mainly focuses on their (empirical) bank- or banking-sector-related de-
terminants. A popular starting point is the seminal study of Ho and Saunders (1981), in which banks
are seen as dynamic dealers in loans and deposits. According to this theory, the demand for loans and
the supply of deposits arrive asynchronously at random time intervals. For every planning period, the
representative (risk-averse) bank selects optimal loan and deposit rates which should minimize the
risks of excessive demand for loans or insuﬃcient supply of deposits (Angbazo 1997). As emerging
from the theoretical model, the main determinants of the optimal diﬀerential between the loan and
deposit rates are the extent of competition in the markets, the interest rate risk to which the bank
is exposed, the degree of risk aversion of the bank management and the size of bank transactions.
Several authors have extended the basic framework of the dealership model, including Allen (1988)
who introduced diﬀerent types of bank products and Angbazo (1997) who augmented the model
with credit default risk. Another model for interest“spreads”is provided by the ﬁrm-theoretical ap-
proach explored in, for example, Wong (1997). In this (static) setting, loan and deposit markets are
simultaneously cleared by demand and supply adjustments.6 Although the model of Wong (1997)
yields implications which are quite similar to those from the dealership model, some additional ex-
planatory factors emerge, as regulation, operating costs and equity capital. The following paragraphs
will elucidate how these models have been tested empirically and which dependent and explanatory
variables were chosen.
Most empirical studies of interest margins and banking proﬁts examine annual bank-level panel
data (e.g. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga 1999, Saunders and Schumacher 2000, Goddard, Molyneux
and Wilson 2004, Maudos and de Guevara 2004).7 Corvoisier and Gropp (2002), Gischer and J¨ ut-
tner (2003) and Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004), on the other hand, use country-level banking data.8
Aggregated time series are analyzed by Chirwa (2003). The preferred banking proﬁtability measure
to be explained is the net interest margin (NIM, net interest income divided by total or earning
assets) as used in Angbazo (1997), Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Saunders and Schumacher
(2000), Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003) and Maudos and de Guevara (2004). Returns on assets (ROA)
or equity (ROE) make up the dependent variable in Chirwa (2003), Goddard et al. (2004), but also in
Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) and Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003). Interest rate diﬀerentials (i.c.
gaps between contractual interest rates and money market rates) as ex-ante measures of banking
proﬁtability appear e.g. in Corvoisier and Gropp (2002).
Concentration is supposed to be one of the main determinants of interest margins and bank
proﬁts. According to the structure performance hypothesis (SPH), increased market power leads to
4lower costs of collusion and to an extraction of rents, so that a positive relation between concentration
and proﬁts should be observable. On the other hand, the eﬃcient structure hypothesis (ESH)
proposes a negative relation, because the increase in concentration is due to the growth of the most
eﬃcient banks (having lower margins) or these banks taking over the less eﬃcient ones (Corvoisier
and Gropp 2002). In empirical work, concentration ratios and Herﬁndahl indices are used, and the
results are mixed. The share of the top 3 banks in total assets is found to positively aﬀect the ROA
in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), whereas the individual bank’s market share and the ROE are
negatively related in Goddard et al. (2004).9 Herﬁndahl indices (the sum of squared market shares)
also reﬂect changes in the market structure between smaller banks. A positive relation is found by
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) to the diﬀerence between contractual lending rates and money market
rates, and a negative one for some diﬀerentials calculated with deposit rates (money market less
deposit rates).
The generation of non-interest income, reﬂecting the importance of fee-based services, is
supposed to occur partly at the expense of interest income (Bikker and Haaf 2002). Indeed, Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt et al. (2004) ﬁnd a negative relation to net interest margins, and Bikker and Haaf (2002) observe
that the interest income, relative to total assets, shrinks following increases in other income.
Operating costs (overheads) are included to investigate whether rising costs are passed on to
the customers in the form of higher margins. This is conﬁrmed, by using the operating-expense ratio
(OER, the share of operating expenses in total assets), by Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). The
quality of management in selecting highly proﬁtable assets and low-cost liabilities is measured by the
cost-income ratio (CIR, operating costs divided by total income) in Maudos and de Guevara (2004).
If the quality of management in the above sense increases, lower operating costs are required in order
to generate one unit of income, hence margins are supposed to be higher. Maudos and de Guevara
(2004) ﬁnd the CIR to be highly negatively signiﬁcant for the net interest margin. Angbazo (1997)
measures the quality of management by the ratio of earning assets to total assets and also observes
a positive relation of management quality to the margin.
The equity ratio is usually supposed to measure the risk aversion of banks. According to
this reasoning, banks want to be highly capitalized and, on account of this, lend more prudentially.
Consequently, interest income could become lower, via lower-risk lending with lower interest rates
because of a decreased risk premium. However, more infrequently occuring loan defaults counteract
this eﬀect. A high equity ratio might be an indication of banks operating over-cautiously, ignoring
potentially proﬁtable diversiﬁcation or other opportunities (Goddard et al. 2004). Another view, also
leading to propose a negative relation of the equity ratio with interest margins, is that a reduction of
the equity share means that the insolvency risk increases. Shareholders therefore demand higher re-
turns and banks increase their interest margins to compensate them accordingly. Opposed arguments
highlight that high equity capital stocks increase the average cost of capital. Maudos and de Guevara
(2004) accentuate the role of equity capital to insulate banks from expected and unexpected (credit)
risk. As holding equity capital is relatively costly compared to debt (because of tax and dilution of
5control reasons), banks with high capital ratios for regulatory or credit reasons seek to recover some
of these costs in the form of higher net interest margins (Angbazo 1997, Saunders and Schumacher
2000, Drakos 2003). Some theories also suggest that well-capitalized banks face lower expected
bankruptcy costs and hence may have lower funding costs. According to this view, higher bank
equity ratios imply larger net interest margins when loan rates vary only slightly with bank equity
(Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. 2004). A positive relation of the equity ratio to interest margins and proﬁts is
found in Angbazo (1997), Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Saunders and Schumacher (2000),
Drakos (2003), as well as in Maudos and de Guevara (2004). The inﬂuence of the capital ratio on
the ROE is negative in Goddard et al. (2004), explained by banks that take more risk having higher
proﬁts, which is in accordance with portfolio theory. However, in view of the regulations on minimum
equity, results obtained using the equity ratio as a measure of risk aversion should be interpreted
with caution (Maudos and de Guevara 2004).
Another variable believed to have an inﬂuence on margins and proﬁts is the implicit taxation
associated with reserve and liquidity requirements. Measures of liquidity used in the literature diﬀer
by which items they include (cash, central bank balances, interbank claims). If more assets are to
be held in cash, reserves or liquid assets, interest income goes down because of the lower risk of and
lower interest rates on these assets. However, banks may like to restore interest income by passing
the respective losses in interest income on to their customers in the form of higher margins. The
ﬁrst (negative) eﬀect is found in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) for reserves divided by total
deposits. Cash and due (used as a proxy for reserves) is positively related to the NIM in Maudos and
de Guevara (2004).
The share of loans in total assets is often also understood as an illiquidity measure or, if data on
loan loss provisions is unavailable, as a proxy for credit risk (Maudos and de Guevara 2004). Besides
illiquidity and risk premiums, a higher loan ratio should be associated with higher interest margins
because loans are the interest-bearing assets with the highest rates. The empirical relation to the
NIM is mostly found to be positive (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga 1999, Chirwa 2003, Maudos and
de Guevara 2004). However, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) report a negative relation to the
return on assets.
The importance of the banking sector or, respectively, the structure of the ﬁnancial system
is a regularly used interest income or proﬁt determinant. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) ﬁnd
a negative relation of the ratio of bank assets to GDP with the NIM and the ROA, supposed to
reﬂect more intense interbank competition in countries with larger markets. The same variable has a
positive eﬀect on interest rate diﬀerentials in Corvoisier and Gropp (2002). A positive eﬀect on the
NIM is found for the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga
(1999), supporting a complementary relation between stock market and bank ﬁnance (but they also
report a negative inﬂuence of stock market capitalization to banking assets). Ex-ante interest rate
diﬀerentials seem to be negatively aﬀected by stock market capitalization to GDP (Corvoisier and
Gropp 2002).
6Implicit interest payments (IIP, appearing also in Ho and Saunders 1981 and Angbazo 1997)
are a measure for“free”banking services that are oﬀered instead of explicitly charging extra interest
on deposits (Maudos and de Guevara 2004). For these services, however, banks could not only charge
through a lower remuneration of liabilities, but also via higher lending rates or both. The eﬀect of
a rise in IIP on the NIM is found to be indeed positive in Saunders and Schumacher (2000) and
Maudos and de Guevara (2004). The reason for this is (as also argued later) that the trend towards
more explicit pricing of services (fees and commissions, non-interest income) has reduced the IIP and
therefore reduced margins.
Some macroeconomic determinants of banks’ interest margins and proﬁts shall also be dis-
cussed. Daily or weekly interest rates are often used to calculate measures of interest rate volatility
and the associated risk. Eﬀects on the net interest margin are typically positive (Saunders and Schu-
macher 2000, Maudos and de Guevara 2004). Although GDP per capita (as a measure of economic
development, but also banking technology) is found to have no statistically signiﬁcant relation to
the NIM in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), the ROA increases with GDP per capita. Using
real GDP growth as a demand side indicator, Goddard et al. (2004) ﬁnd a positive relation to the
return on equity. GDP growth is insigniﬁcant in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), but negatively
associated with the net interest margin in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004).
Other potential determinants (not used as often) in net interest margin and proﬁtability re-
gressions are, for example, the importance of oﬀ-balance-sheet business (Goddard et al. 2004), the
ratio of non-interest-earning to total assets (Saunders and Schumacher 2000), the inﬂation rate
(Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga 1999), the share of problem loans (Corvoisier and Gropp 2002), and
the real interest rate (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga 1999). Bank size is also an issue because of
economies of scale, but its supposed positive eﬀect may be partially oﬀset by greater ability to di-
versify resulting in lower risk and a lower required return (Chirwa 2003). Nevertheless, a positive
relation to the NIM is found by Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999).
In cross-country studies other factors still play a role, such as whether there is a deposit
insurance scheme, the explicit taxation of the banking sector, (interest rate) regulation, as well as
legal and institutional factors. Across banks, it might be of signiﬁcance whether a bank is state-owned
or foreign.
3 Data issues and variable selection
3.1 Remarks on data sources and recent developments in Austrian banking
Data on proﬁt and loss account items for the Austrian banking sector comes from quarterly bank
reports and balance sheet data from monthly balance sheet reports (almost all banks operating in
Austria have to report on the legal basis of the Austrian Banking Act).10 Balance sheet items are
7quarterly averages of monthly (of three end-of-month) ﬁgures. In general (exceptions as indicated
in appendix C), the data source is the Austrian Central Bank (the Oesterreichische Nationalbank,
OeNB), and the sample period ranges from the ﬁrst quarter of 1987 to the second quarter of 2005
(74 observations). See appendix C for a summary of series used and a short description of each one.
In the last 20 years, the Austrian banking sector has undergone some large structural changes
(see also Ali and Gstach 2000, Braumann 2004 and Waschiczek 2005). The most important structural
break from deregulation occured in 1994, when Austria joined the European Economic Area (EEA).
It is common opinion that the associated removal of entry barriers (freedom of establishment)11 had
substantial eﬀects on bank proﬁtability. Additional changes were, for example, the abolition of the
anchor or central interest rate for deposit rates, the implementation of Stage III of the European
Monetary Union, changes in capital requirements, ﬁnancial (technological) innovations, as well as
an altered ownership structure of banks (privatization of public-sector stakes in Austrian banks,
associated with more foreign ownership).
Waschiczek (2005) describes the observable disintermediation trend as a process which is
driven mainly by enterprises making use of expanded ﬁnancing options (corporate bonds, share
issues, venture capital), but not by a more restrictive corporate-sector lending of banks or changes
in the investment decisions of households. While the relative importance of bank intermediation has
declined, the competitive pressure of euro area banks has remained fairly low to date relating to the
physical presence of these banks on the Austrian market (Waschiczek 2005). However, the potential
increase in competition (due to entry threat) is also important. Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003) argue
that competition in the banking sector is of an increasingly global nature, above all, in wholesale
markets, the trading business, as well as in debt securities and share markets. Loans and deposits are
not concerned that much because local ties between banks and their customers are more important
concerning these matters.
A higher degree of competition in banking should, via lower monopoly power and an incentive
for banks to reduce their costs, lead to the reduction of prices with positive eﬀects on investment,
growth and welfare (Weill 2004). Waschiczek (2005) lists increased activity in mergers and acquisi-
tions, the cutting of resources and the increased business activities in Central and Eastern European
(CEE) countries as the strategic responses of Austrian banks to these changing conditions.
For selected years, Table 1 shows the percentage division of assets and liabilities of the Austrian
banking sector (domestic and foreign assets are separated) as well as the balance sheet total. On the
assets side, it can be seen that the shares of cash and central bank balances, interbank claims and
loans (despite rising loans to foreign non-banks) have decreased over time. On the other hand, the
share of foreign securities and participations increased from 1.6 (1990) to 12.4 percent (2005). The
liabilities side of the balance sheet displays a rise in the equity ratio and a sharp decrease in non-bank
deposits at the expense of foreign issues of secured debt after 1995.
8The ﬁrst panel of Table 2 shows a similar division for income and costs (selected periods)
according to the standard illustriation of the bank income statement. Total operating income is
calculated as the sum of the net interest income, net fees and commissions, income from securities
and participations, net proﬁt or loss from ﬁnancial operations and other operating income. The share
of net interest income declined steadily, whereas the contributions of net fees and commissions as
well as the income from securities and participations mounted. By splitting total income into costs
(only staﬀ and administrative expenses are left as expenses like interest, fees and commissions etc.
were already deducted in the calculation of total income) and proﬁt, it can be seen that the share
of operating proﬁt has been rather constant, whereas the share of administrative expenses has risen
and banks have succeeded in reducing that of staﬀ costs. The second part of the table provides a
more detailed illustriation with interest and fee-based expenses shown explicitly.
In selecting our variables, adequate measures to represent the before-mentioned structural
changes as well as the responses of the Austrian banking sector to these changes were also explored.
Structural changes can be seen in the decreased importance of net interest income stemming from
the accelerated competition in the interest business from the mid-1990s on. Additionally, it can be
observed that Austrian ﬁrms increasingly seek non-bank ﬁnance (as, for example, banks also stepped
up their issues of secured debt) and that households also changed their investment behavior towards
a heightened use of capital market instruments. These developments show up in an increase of the
income of banks from fees and commissions.
The banking sector’s reactions to the changed environment may be seen from, for example,
a loan ratio declining at the expense of securities and participations. This, as well as the partial
replacement of (cheaper) deposits with secured debt on the liabilities side of the banking sector
balance sheet, contributed to a reduced relevance of net interest income. Consequently, the eﬀects
of structural change and the banking sectors’ reactions cannot be stricly separated in explaining
trends in net interest margins and banking proﬁts.
3.2 Bank performance measures
In general, bank performance and behavior can be described by ex-ante or ex-post measures (Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt and Huizinga 1999). An ex-ante measure would be the diﬀerence between contractual rates
charged on (or oﬀered ones for) loans and rates paid on deposits (typically relating to new busi-
ness). Ex-post measures account for the actual interest income less the actual interest expenses.
The approaches of applying either one or the other diﬀer by the ex-post margins being determined
by loan and deposit volumes, loan defaults, changes in the composition of assets and liabilities, as
well as changes in their maturity structure. In this paper, ex-post measures of interest margins and
proﬁtability are solely applied.
The net interest margin (NIM) is mostly analyzed in the empirical literature and is deﬁned as
the net interest income (interest income less interest expenses) relative to total or interest-earning
9assets. Both will be examined here and named NIM (TA, for total assets) and NIM (IEA, for interest-
earning assets). The interest-earning assets in our calculations are interbank claims, claims against
non-banks and ﬁxed-income securities.
Our third measure, often called“total spread”, is the average interest earned on assets less the
average interest expense paid on liabilities, as deﬁned in Equation (1).12







As a fourth measure for the development of interest income, a spread which only considers
business with non-banks (loans to and deposits from) was calculated. The formula for the net interest
spread (non-banks) is equivalent to (1), but interest income and expenses are from claims against
and for liabilities to non-banks only, which are also the respective denominators.
The proﬁtability measures considered are the return on equity (ROE) and the return on as-
sets (ROA). Operating proﬁt (the numerator) is observed before deductions for taxes and loan loss
provisions are made because no quarterly data is available on these two items for such a long pe-
riod. Equity capital in the denominator of ROE is the book value of equity from the banking sector
balance sheet. This is somewhat dissatisfactory as equity capital therefore only comprises registered
(nominal) capital and disclosed reserves (resulting in core or tier 1 capital), as well as some parts of
supplementary (tier 2) capital.13 Therefore, this measure is not compatible with the capital used in
describing (the compliance with) capital adequacy rules.
Finally, a so-called non-interest margin, deﬁned as the share of non-interest income in total
assets, was calculated. Non-interest income contains the net fees and commissions income, the proﬁt
from ﬁnancial operations, and the income from securities and participations.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the bank performance measures14 that were calculated,
as well as for the explanatory variables which will be described in the next section. For the time
paths of interest margins, spreads and proﬁtability see Figures 1 to 4.
The net interest margin which is calculated by dividing through total assets could be supposed
to be shrinking (excessively) over time because of the rise in non-interest-earning assets (see the
structural changes above). However, net interest income also decreased relative to interest-earning
assets (from about 1995 on). The spread in the business with non-banks also shows a development
over time which is similar to that of the margins. Only the total spread increased after 1998. Figure
3 illustrates how banks managed to earn a relatively constant return on assets over time. The return
on equity fell quite heavily and the non-interest margin shows a slow but steady increase during the
sample period.
103.3 Explanatory and control variables
The proposed determinants of interest margins and banking proﬁts that enter our analysis (see also
appendix C)15 include two measures applicable for an examination of bank performance cyclicality.
GDP growth, according to Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004), should proxy investment opportunities in
the economy (which are cyclical) and therefore also represents business opportunities for banks. As
a measure of the interest cycle, the yield of ﬁxed-interest bonds is applied (results obtained from
using, for example, the 3-month interbank rate instead are qualitatively similar and will therefore not
be reported). Interest rate risk (volatility) will be proxied by the standard deviation of daily bond
yields.
The measure of competition used is a concentration ratio, the share of the top 10 banks in
total assets.16 As there is no clear relation of concentration and competition a priori (structure
performance vs. eﬃcient structure hypothesis), the literature proposes diﬀerent other approaches
to quantify competition and market contestability. However, these methods unfortunately are not
applicable for a single-country analysis in the time series context.17
Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003) vehemently recommend thinking about the increasingly global
nature of competition in banking and therefore searching for adequate related proxy variables. The
ﬁrst variable they use is the ratio of fee to interest income, which measures the (deregulation-induced)
explicit pricing of services and therefore also replaces the implicit interest payments variable. Bikker
and Groeneveld (2000) support the inclusion of other income parts (from trading etc.) in relating
non-interest income to interest income. Being compatible with the arguments of Gischer and J¨ uttner
(2003), these income parts are raised from business which is subject to more intense (and global)
competition than the credit business. A summary measure should emerge for the degree to which
banks have adjusted to the new ﬁnancial deregulation environment. In the end, a rise in non-interest
income is supposed to represent technological advances, product-mix changes (expansion of low-
risk activities) and the banks’ exposure to international competition. A negative inﬂuence on the
NIM should be exerted if the shift to explicit pricing of services through fees and to other non-
interest income narrowed margins in the interest business. Since the fee income business is more
competitive, the ROA should also be inﬂuenced negatively. Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004) argue that
well-developed fee income sources will produce lower interest margins due to cross-subsidization of
bank activities. We use the share of non-interest income in total operating income with the non-
interest income including net fees and commissions, income from securities and participations and
net ﬁnancial operations income.
The second global competition variable applied by Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003) is the openness
of the ﬁnancial sector which they measure by the share of foreign assets and foreign liabilities of
the country in GDP. In this paper, on the other hand, a banking-sector-related measure is proposed,
which is the sum of foreign assets and liabilites of the banking sector divided by its total assets. The
expected sign is also negative.
11The share of the book value of equity in total assets is used as the equity capital measure.18
As mentioned before, there are arguments for eﬀects of the changes in the equity ratio on margins
in both directions.
Banks that hold a high fraction of liquid assets have lower net interest margins (Demirg¨ u¸ c-
Kunt et al. 2004). A measure of liquid assets that includes cash, central bank balances and interbank
claims cannot be used along with a loans ratio, because until the end of 1993, the two ratios were
almost perfectly collinear (the shares of other assets in total assets were constant). Instead, we use
the share of cash and central bank balances in total assets.
The share of loans in the banks’ portfolios is typically a measure for credit risk. Maudos and
de Guevara (2004) also include the level of loans to represent the level of operations. The larger the
latter, the larger the potential loss, and therefore the larger the margins shall be. The stock of loans
divided by total assets, as it is also calculated in this paper, might also be seen as a reverse liquidity
measure. If a high share of total assets is loaned out, the bank might become illiquid.
According to Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003), the operating-expense ratio that should be used is
operating expenses related to gross income, which in fact is the cost-income ratio (CIR). Following
common calculation rules, expenses include staﬀ, general administration and some other expenses,
but no interest and fee-based expenses. The latter are usually deducted from the respective income
ﬁgures (so that net interest and net fee-based income are added up along with other income).
Overhead costs also measure cost ineﬃciency and market competition (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. 2004),
and Maudos and de Guevara (2004) use the CIR as a proxy for the quality of management in
explaining the net interest margin.
4 Methodology
In analyzing time series data for the Austrian banking sector we use vector autoregressive (VAR)
models and therefore treat each variable as potentially endogenous.19 Unsurprisingly, the Schwarz
information criterion leads us to chose one lag in each case (see section 5) as a consequence of the
rather large number of variables. In the end, results from impulse response analysis from VAR models
where the variables are in levels with a time trend also included (following the recommendations of
Ashley and Verbrugge 2004, for the estimation of impulse response functions and conﬁdence intervals
for same) are presented. Seasonal dummies are in the model as well, and we will report responses
to unit shocks for a maximum time horizon of eight quarters. In obtaining structural responses,
the underidentiﬁcation problem is solved by applying a recursive structure (causal chain) to the
contemporaneous relations between our variables. Technically, this amounts to using the so-called
Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form VAR residuals to
recover the structural shocks.
12Impulse response functions and corresponding error bands are obtained (simulated) via Monte
Carlo Integration using adaptations of the RATS example programs monteva2 and montesur (obtained
from estima.com). Following Sims and Zha (1999), among other things, fractiles are used instead
of standard deviations in computing error bands (the two-standard-deviation band is replaced by the
0.025 and 0.975 fractiles to approximate a 95% conﬁdence interval). Generalized impulse response
functions (see Koop, Pesaran and Potter 1996 and Pesaran and Shin 1998), which are to be preferred
in nonlinear models, were also calculated. In general, qualitative results from these responses are
similar to the reported ones.
For investigating asymmetry in the adjustment to cycles-related shocks, we quote responses
from a VAR where the equation for the bank performance variable is speciﬁed as (example for the
NIM equation in a VAR with lag order of one including the growth rate of real GDP, GROWTH)
NIMt = µ +
j 
i=1
αjRHSj,t−1 + βGROWTHt−1 + γGROWTHt−1It−1 + δIt−1 + φZ +  t (2)
where RHSj stands for j explanatory variables apart from GDP growth. The indicator function
(dummy) It−1 represents cases of rising (falling) growth rates of real GDP so that the β coeﬃcients




First, how (non-)interest margins and proﬁt variables vary with the business and interest cycle will
be examined. Table 4 reports their responses to unit shocks in the bond yield and GDP growth in
bivariate vector autoregressions. It can be seen that, in the end (after 8 quarters), interest margins
and spreads rise after a shock in the interest rate, but also that it takes some time for this to
emerge. For several quarters, the levels of the return on equity and assets are signiﬁcantly lower
than they would have been without the shock. Both the ROE and the ROA rise over time and
approximately reach the before-shock level after 8 quarters again. The non-interest margin shows a
similar behaviour, but is never signiﬁcantly below its baseline time path.
From the responses to unit shocks in the growth rate of real GDP we see that all interest
margins and proﬁtability measures are countercyclical.21 Margins and spreads are lower than without
the shock, above all, after one quarter, and the ROE and ROA remain signiﬁcantly below the level
they would have been at without the shock for a longer period. The non-interest margin is temporarily
above its baseline level.
13Although many of the“eﬀects”in Table 4 appear to be signiﬁcant in terms of the error bands,
they appear to be quite unimportant if one bears in mind that we examine the reactions to unit
(one percentage point) shocks in the interest rate or GDP growth. A naive calculation based on the
variable values for the second quarter of 2005 (and therefore holding the balance sheet total ﬁxed)
would yield that a reduction in the net interest margin (TA) of 0.01 percentage points amounts to
banks losing a net interest income of about 70 million euro. Representing approximately 4 percent of
the respective quarter’s net interest income and 5 percent of before-tax proﬁt, this amount appears
to be non-trivial. However, a reduction in the net interest margin does not necessarily need to be
associated with a reduction in net interest income. As bank assets and liabilities have increased
tremendously during the sample period, responses of incomes (proﬁts) are examined in section 5.4.
Table 5 gives a short insight into results from our asymmetric speciﬁcation in Equation (2).
It is evident (results not reported) that there is practically no diﬀerence in the responses of all
variables to shocks in the bond yield depending on the case speciﬁed (rising or falling interest rate).
The countercyclicality of margins, spreads and proﬁtability measures (the table exemplarily shows
responses of the return on assets) appears to emerge mainly from bank behavior in cyclical upturns.
Our basic VAR speciﬁcation consists of the standard deviation of interest rates, openness,
the concentration, equity, loans and cash ratios, the non-interest income share in total income
and the cost-income ratio.22 This mix of variables that are either banking-speciﬁc or describe the
macroeconomic environment shall explain the development of each of the margins and proﬁtability
measures. The basic vector autoregressions are then augmented with the bond yield and the growth
rate of GDP to see whether the cyclical patterns from the bivariate regressions remain or are explained
by the cyclical behavior of the remaining included variables. As we do not have a full structural model
for such a large number of variables, the Cholesky decomposition method is applied in the following
form. The standard deviation of the bond yield is seen as determined at the macroeconomic level
(monetary policy, inﬂation uncertainty, etc.) and therefore treated as contemporaneously exogenous
(and therefore comes ﬁrst in the variable sequence). On the other hand, the respective banking sector
performance measure is the endogenous variable of interest and is therefore always placed at the end.
In between, we position balance sheet variables before items from the income statement. Openness
is put right after interest rate risk because it is preferably interpreted as a strategic variable (one
of the reactions of the banking sector to deregulation and liberalization).23 Concentration appears
before the three balance sheet ratios (equity, loans and cash ratio) because it is seen as being partly
driven by longer-term decisions as, for example, the acquisition of participations. The ﬁrst income
statement variable in the order is the share of non-interest income in total income (the argument is
similar to that used with balance sheet items for openness) followed by the cost-income ratio. Results
for our seven margins, spreads and proﬁtability variables can be found in Tables 6 to 12.
145.2 Basic results
Interest rate volatility
Shocks in the standard deviation of the bond yield have, in no case, signiﬁcant eﬀects on the dynamic
paths of the margins, spreads and proﬁt ratios. As a unit increase in our interest rate volatility measure
is unrealistically high, the eﬀects reported in the tables are also practically small.
Concentration
There also are no signiﬁcant responses of any dependent measure of banking proﬁtability to shocks
in the concentration ratio. However, the signs of the responses to changes in the concentration ratio
are negative for the net interest margins and the total spread, but mostly positive for the return
on equity and the non-interest margin. For the other two measures (the net interest spread in the
non-bank business and the return on assets), the responses are apparently zero.
In explaining a negative relation between concentration and margins, the (empirical) literature
oﬀers several possibilities. As Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) argue, larger banks tend to have
lower margins and proﬁts and smaller overheads, which is consistent with the eﬃcient structure
hypothesis. Or these large banks simply have a diﬀerent structure in their interest-earning assets and
interest-bearing liabilities. It could be the case that larger banks are more capable of diversifying
(and have better risk-management skills) resulting in lower risk and required returns (Chirwa 2003).
Another argument, that the threat of potential entry also forces banks with high market shares,
under certain conditions, to price their products competitively (the contestability theory in Bikker
and Groeneveld 2000), is potentially captured by the inclusion of the openness variable.
Apart from the fact that the concentration-induced changes in margins and proﬁts are eco-
nomically small, we tend to conﬁrm that the concentration ratio, in this form and in such a model
constellation, is not an adequate measure of competition. As the openness variable is interpreted
as a (global) competition measure, and the cost-income ratio, on the other hand, changes with the
banks’ eﬃciency, showing what concentration really measures is not that straightforward.
Based on these results, one cannot detect a channel through which the competition policy of
the European Union could have succeeded in bringing bank margins down via deregulation (Second
Banking Directive, the Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan, etc.) and a subsequent decrease
of concentration in the banking sector. Although there is no signiﬁcant relation between the concen-
tration ratio and the net interest margins, spreads and bank returns, this does not necessarily mean
that the EU policies did not contribute to the observed reduction in, for example, margins over time.
What can indeed be observed in the data are the reactions of the banking sector to the changing
environment. Besides increased consolidation eﬀorts in the banking industry, especially large Austrian
banks widened their assets by expanding abroad, leading to relatively high concentration ratios from
15the later 1990s to 2002, a time of shrinking margins not only in Austria. However, it seems that also
the mergers of the 1990s did not have the eﬀect of signiﬁcantly increasing margins in the banking
sector.24
Openness and the share of non-interest income in total income
Openness (the share of the sum of foreign assets and liabilities in the balance sheet total) and the
ratio of non-interest income to total income are intended to represent two main structural changes
in banking - the increase in (global) competition and the strengthened importance of fee-based (and
other) income at the expense of interest income. Openness decreased from 52 to 43 percent between
1989 and 1995, and rose rather continuously (with two intermissions) up to 64 % again thereafter.
The share of non-interest income in total income, on the other hand, increased very steadily from
below 30 percent in the late eighties to over 50 % in recent years.
Shocks in our openness variable, in fact, signiﬁcantly alter the dynamic paths of net interest
margins, as well as that of the more comprehensive interest spread. The eﬀects on these variables
are, as presumed, negative. Taking its development over time into account, openness can explain a
large fraction of the fall in the mentioned margins and spreads. Although openness shocks do not
lead the net interest spread in the non-bank business to signiﬁcantly deviate from its baseline path,
its responses are of equal magnitude like those of the other interest margins and spreads. This is
against the presumption that openness exerts its inﬂuence on the net interest margin (TA), above
all, through an expansion of the balance sheet.
Responses of the non-interest margin to shocks in openness are positive (but not signiﬁcantly),
indicating that banks increasingly sought to ﬁnd other (not interest-related) sources of income follow-
ing deregulation and liberalization. General proﬁtability, when measured by the return on assets, is
nevertheless negatively (also not signiﬁcantly) aﬀected by shocks in openness. The return on equity,
on the other hand, seems to, at least temporarily, increase subsequent to such changes.
In general, changes in the non-interest income share in total operating income of the banking
sector have a negligible and insigniﬁcant impact on margins, spreads and proﬁtability. It might be
the case that both structural change variables (openness and non-interest income) explain quite the
same variation in banking performance.
The loan ratio
The loan ratio is also supposed to capture some of the reactions of Austrian banks to the altered
business conditions from 1994 on. The share of loans to non-banks in total assets had risen from 45 to
about 52 percent by the end of 1992, but decreased subsequently (with periods of interim increases)
to 46 % again by the end of the sample period. Especially after 1997, ﬁxed-interest securities and
participations gained in importance (their shares in total assets increased) relative to loans to non-
16banks. However, the results from our analysis of impulse response functions do not indicate that
shocks in the loan ratio had a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the development of net interest margins, interest
spreads and proﬁtability measures. After some time, the responses are mostly positive (the main
exception is the return on equity) and not too small. For example, from 1998 to 2005, the loans
ratio decreased by about 5 percentage points, and the net interest margin (TA) by approximately
0.09 percentage points. So, based on the estimated response paths, changes in the loan ratio could
(if signiﬁcant) explain a large fraction of margin and proﬁtability changes. However, there were also
longer time periods with practically no change in the loans ratio and decreasing margins (1994-1997).
The equity ratio
The share of (the book value of) equity capital in the balance sheet total rather steadily increased
over the sample period (from about 3.2 percent in 1987 to 5.2 in 2005). An exception occured in (the
second half of) 1999 and 2000, where the equity ratio temporarily dropped by 0.4 percentage points.
At the same time (one or two quarters thereafter), the prior decrease in net interest margins and
spreads intermittently stopped. By evaluating the time series paths of the equity share and margins,
it can be seen that both measures are moving in opposite directions most of the time. However,
by calculating correlation coeﬃcients between detrended series, it can be observed that the relation
between the deviations from the time trend is positive. Therefore, if the remaining control variables
can adequately explain the downward trend in margins, the eﬀect of a rise in the equity share could
emerge to be positive.
Results related to interest margins and spreads pretty much follow our above observations.
Following a shock in the equity ratio, interest margins and spreads (often signiﬁcantly) fall in the short
run. However, after reaching the maximum negative deviation from their baseline paths (typically
in the quarter following the equity ratio shock), interest margins and spreads rise over time. After
ﬁve or six quarters, responses become positive in these cases. The opposite path emerges for the
non-interest margin, as it rises in the short run and the equity ratio eﬀect diminishes subsequently.
In the end, a positive relation between the equity ratio and net interest margins emerges (as
in the discussed empirical literature), although banks do not immediately react in this way after the
shock in the equity ratio. Finding explanations for the negative short-run eﬀect is more diﬃcult,
and some of them might also be data-driven. Changes in the structure of the liabilities side of
the balance sheet (we have not accounted for) may produce this short-term negative correlation.
Periods of surging interbank liabilities (1999-2000) and the trend to replace non-bank deposits with
own issues of secured debt (reduced margins via increases in funding costs), especially since the late
1990s, might be candidates for these neglected factors. However, it can be observed (see also section
5.3) that the negative reaction becomes smaller (shrinks to about -0.7 for the net interest margins,
for example) and statistically insigniﬁcant if GDP growth is added as an explanatory variable.
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Until the third quarter of 1995, the cash ratio lay between 1.6 and 1.8 percent. Afterwards, it
decreased steadily to about 0.8 %. As the development of the cash ratio over time seems very similar
to those of the net interest margins and spreads, the question is whether any (positive) relation
remains after controlling for the other factors.
It turns out that the net interest margins and spreads increase after shocks in the cash ratio.
However, the contemporaneous response of the net interest spread, which is also fairly large in
magnitude, is the only statistically signiﬁcant one. Responses of the non-interest margin are mostly
negative, and those of the proﬁtability measures are rather small. Altogether, it appears that changes
in cash and central bank balances do not play a very important role in explaining bank performance
measures, although the eﬀects do not seem to vanish completely over time.
The cost-income ratio
In empirical work, the cost-income ratio is often used to capture developments of the quality of
management (with an expected negative relation to margins). The speciﬁcation of Maudos and
de Guevara (2004), for example, includes the CIR alongside the operating-expense ratio, which is
supposed to represent the cost burden. A positive relation to margins is expected (and found) for
the OER in their regressions, as banks seek to recover risen costs in subsequent proﬁts.
In our regressions, only responses to shocks to the CIR are evaluated.25 The contemporaneous
responses of net interest margins, spreads and proﬁt measures are found to be signiﬁcantly negative
(negative deviations of the ROE from its baseline path are signiﬁcant also in subsequent quarters).
This is in line with, for example, Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003) who test diﬀerent cost measures and
conclude that, whatever variable they use, a lowering in the cost-structure ratio unsurprisingly in-
creases proﬁtability. However, these results suggest that Austrian banks do not immediately pass
over cost increases to, for example, higher interest margins. Interest margins and proﬁts at least
return to their previous levels as the negative cost eﬀects are only relevant in the very short term.
5.3 Interest rates, GDP growth and the cyclicality of margins
Interest rate and business cycles are captured by including the bond yield variable as well as GDP
growth in our vector autoregressions. Responses following shocks in these two variables are the only
results from the augmented models that are shown in Tables 6 to 12. Relating to the eﬀects of the
variables already discussed, any major diﬀerences to our basic results will nevertheless be mentioned
in the following paragraphs.
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In Tables 6 to 8 we see that the (signiﬁcantly) positive long-term eﬀects of shocks in the bond yield,
which emerged in the bivariate setting on net interest margins and the total spread, diminish if we
control for all the other variables. Nevertheless, after the contemporaneous negative response of
these bank performance variables, the deviation from the path without the shock turns positive after
some time.
Contemporary reactions of all interest margins and spreads are more negative than before and
are found to be statistically signiﬁcant for both net interest margins. One line of reasoning to explain
the latter result could be related to some kind of interest rate smoothing on outstanding credit
amounts. Any increase in deposit and saving rates in this case will contribute to a fall in net interest
income (which could also be observed if, for example, interest-bearing liabilities increased relative to
interest-earning assets after a shock in the interest rate). In section 5.4, however, we will see that
the most likely explanation emerges from the distinction of diﬀerent sources of net interest income.
The practically smaller and still insigniﬁcant responses for the non-bank interest spread inherently
indicate that the loan and savings business with non-banks may not be the source of the short-term
shrinking in net interest margins following an interest rate shock.
For the returns on equity and assets, contemporaneous responses are a bit larger in absolute
magnitude (they are negative) and therefore still signiﬁcant. The non-interest spread also deviates
negatively from its baseline path, though not signiﬁcantly.
Business cycles
In this section, we examine whether the observed countercyclicality of net interest margins and returns
on equity and assets remains present after controlling for all the variables we discussed up to now. If
the latter represent the channels through which the countercyclicality of interest margins and proﬁts
operates, we would expect GDP growth not to remain statistically signiﬁcant.
From our results in Tables 6 to 12 we see that this is not the case.26 Only the net interest
spread for the business with non-banks only as well as the non-interest margin feature no signiﬁcant
responses to shocks in the growth rate of real GDP (with the deviations of the non-interest margin
from the path without the shock being positive in many quarters). The statistically signiﬁcant
negative responses of margins, spreads and proﬁt measures emerge mainly in the ﬁrst and second
quarter after the shock in GDP growth. In almost every case, they start to diminish after the ﬁrst
quarter following the shock.
Without any additional information, it could be assumed that the margin countercyclicality
has several sources as appropriate changes in interest rates, changes in the volumes and structure of
assets and liabilities, or all of these, maybe diﬀerently for outstanding amounts and new business,
or the loans and savings vs. other business parts. Although it is not possible to bring out the
19ultimate explanation(s), some of these possibilities can be relatively safely ruled out. First, there
is empirical evidence for Austria that the diﬀerential between bank loan and deposit interest rates
(for new business) does not decrease in economic expansions (Braumann 2004, Burgstaller 2006).27
Second, we would not expect that, in upturns, the interest-bearing liabilities show larger increases
than the interest-earning assets.
It might also be the case that the ﬁnancing behavior of ﬁrms changes during the cycle. In
upturns, ﬁrms increasingly make use of ﬁnancing instruments diﬀerent from bank loans. During
recessions, on the other hand, the majority of ﬁrms relies on banks.28 While our speciﬁcation
certainly suﬀers from not containing a measure of the time-varying importance of the banking sector
in total ﬁnance (and ﬁnancial investments) or relative to GDP, we will see in the next section that
the main explanations are diﬀerent from the ones just discussed.
In the end, we see that at least in the short run, net interest margins and interest spreads
shrink in an econmic upturn. However, their responses (calculated on the basis of a one percentage
point change in GDP growth), as well as those of the proﬁt measures, are estimated to be rather
small. Soon, these negative deviations from baseline paths will be reduced, but also the following
increases will be very small.
Another result is that, although the included variables cannot explain the cyclicality of margins
and proﬁts, they actually stash away any asymmetric eﬀect of growth. So among them are the
relevant channels through which the asymmetry that was found works.
Additionally remarkable are some of the changes in the eﬀects of our basic explanatory variables
in this setting, which partly seem to have been biased in the case of not considering interest rates
and business cycles. Responses to shocks in the concentration ratio increase (previously negative
responses decrease in absolute terms). Consequently, they draw near zero for margins and spreads,
but remain statistically insigniﬁcant for the returns on equity and assets. As mentioned before,
responses to shocks in the equity ratio lose their negative signiﬁcance in the short run.
5.4 Auxiliary results for income and proﬁt levels
To gain further insights and to disentangle some of the possible explanations for our previous results,
additional models with the levels of net interest income, net interest income from business with
non-banks, operating proﬁt and non-interest income as variables of interest were estimated. Their
temporal development is depicted in Figures 5 and 6. Also equity capital, loans, cash and operating
expenses are applied in levels. All these variables are measured in millions of euros. The results from
impulse response analysis are to be found in Tables 13 to 17.
The eﬀects on the net interest income estimated for a shock in interest rate volatility are still
negligible and the net interest income indeed shrinks after a rise in banking sector openness. However,
only the maximum negative deviation from the path without the openness shock is indicated to be
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regressions seems to be driven by balance sheet level eﬀects to some extent. Following shocks in
the concentration ratio, we observe that net interest income is higher than before the shock in all
quarters thereafter. On the other hand, the negative short-run relation of equity with interest income
is not present in this setting, neither in terms of statistical nor practical signiﬁcance. The level of
loans, on the other hand, gains in explanatory power. Diﬀerences to our former results also emerge
for non-interest income and operating expenses as, after shocks in both variables, the net interest
income increases after falling below no-shock-levels in the short run. The associated deviations from
no-shock-paths, however, are never statistically signiﬁcant. Results for the interest rate cycle are,
more or less, conﬁrmed, but overall eﬀects of a GDP growth shock on net interest income turn
positive after a year.
In the case of the operating proﬁt (Table 14), there are practically no qualitative changes to
previous results. Operating expenses, as well as non-interest income, are excluded as explanatory
variables as they one-for-one pass over to proﬁts. With non-interest income (Table 15), positive
reactions to a rise in openness or GDP growth are more pronounced than indicated by results with all
variables included as ratios. Also the levels of loans and operating expenses are positively signiﬁcant
contemporaneously.
The most insightful results emerge from the responses of net interest income from non-banks.
Table 16 reports the basic model, and Table 17 shows the augmented model including the bond yield
and GDP growth. From the former we see that neither shocks in openness nor in the equity capital
result in signiﬁcant deviations of the net interest income in the business with non-banks from its
baseline path. Though also not statistically signiﬁcant, responses to concentration-ratio shocks are
always positive. Net interest income from non-banks also reacts positively to impulses in the volume
of loans, and negatively to increases in operating expenses in the quarter the shock occurs. The
negative contemporaneous reaction to shocks in interest rate volatility disappears in the full model
(Table 17).
Shocks representing a rise in the concentration ratio lead to a signiﬁcantly rising net interest
income from non-banks in the augmented model. Two additional eﬀects point to the necessity to
diﬀerentiate net interest income according to its source. First, one can observe the fact that, relatively
quickly after the shock, the one earned by granting loans to, above all, ﬁrms and households (which
are ﬁnanced by their deposits and savings) rises after an interest rate shock. This indicates that
the negative contemporaneous reaction of total net interest income originates from the banking
sector’s net position in the interbank and the securities markets (including the cost to bear for own
outstanding debt in the form of bonds). Second, the net interest income from non-banks is not
countercyclical as it is above its baseline level already in the ﬁrst quarter after a shock in GDP
growth. So the previously observed countercyclicality of margins and spreads is, to a large extent, a
product of (cyclical) changes in the level and composition of the banking sector’s balance sheet.
216 Concluding remarks
In this paper, the empirical determinants of the Austrian banking sector’s net interest margins
(spreads) and proﬁtability using quarterly time series data for the period from 1987 to 2005 were
analyzed. The proposed inﬂuental measures contain proxies for structural changes (occuring within
the banking sector as well as in its business environment) and macroeconomic variables. Changes
in interest rates and GDP growth represent the factors used to examine the development of ex-post
margins, spreads and proﬁts over the business and the interest cycle.
The basic results show that, after controlling for interest and business cycle eﬀects, shocks in
the concentration ratio, the loan ratio and the cash ratio produce no statistically signiﬁcant responses
in net interest margins, interest spreads and proﬁtability measures. There also is no practically im-
portant trade-oﬀ between net interest and non-interest income. Most of our banking performance
measures transitorily shrink after an unexpected increase in the cost-income ratio. Banking sector
openness, measured via the sum of foreign assets and liabilities which was rising over the sample
period, explains a signiﬁcant part of the observed decrease in net interest margins and spreads in
Austria. Apart from the margin in non-interest income, all bank performance measures appear to
evolve countercyclically, although not all of them show statistically signiﬁcant responses to shocks in
the growth rate of real GDP. Interest margins, spreads and returns on equity and assets contempo-
raneoulsy fall after an interest rate impulse.
Auxiliary regressions, using income and proﬁt levels instead of ratios to balance sheet ﬁgures,
enable a more sensible interpretation of these results. Both the countercyclicality and the contempo-
raneous fall of net interest income after interest rate increases are due to corresponding changes in
net interest income from securities as well as interbank claims and liabilities. The net interest income
from the loans-and-deposits business with non-banks signiﬁcantly increases with higher interest rates,
more loans and rising concentration in the banking industry. The ongoing increases in banking sector
openness have not led to signiﬁcant income losses from these transactions.
The results suggest that the extensive use of net interest margins and returns on assets (and
other ratios) in studies of banking performance and behavior should be reconsidered, as these mea-
sures do not tell the whole story. As changes in net interest income may be attributable to the
development of several factors (interest rates for outstanding amounts and new business on both
sides of the balance sheet, the level and the structure of interest-earning assets and interest-bearing
liabilities), further research will have to go more into these details. One should, however, be careful
when deriving causal eﬀects from the reported results. The use of time series data only allows a
certain number of explanatory variables. Therefore, important determinants of bank proﬁtability (oﬀ-
balance-sheet business, for example) may also have been missed. Additionally, our variables may not
adequately account for some trends that were important for the structure, conduct and performance
of the Austrian banking sector.
22The countercyclical behavior of many of the examined margins and proﬁt measures, in principle,
is in line with the ﬁnancial accelerator hypothesis. There are, however, some obstacles to conclude
from our results that Austrian banks amplify the business cycle. First, net interest income from
granting loans and taking deposits actually moves with the cycle and the eﬀects of shocks in GDP
growth on the spread in the non-bank business are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Having in
mind that lending-deposit rate diﬀerentials, at least for new business, do not change very much with
economic activity in Austria, the reason for the observed behavior of the non-bank spread is likely to
stem from substitution processes within loans and within deposits. Second, the negative responses
of the net interest margins to growth shocks were shown to be due to the countercyclical movements
of the net interest income from securities and interbank relations, and to endogenous changes in the
level and structure of balance sheets. Third, the respective adjustments in margins and spreads are
not very large in magnitude.
23Notes
1Several studies present theoretical reasons for countercyclical markups in goods markets. For example, Rotemberg
and Saloner (1986) argue that oligopolists behave more competitively in periods of high demand and therefore markups
are countercyclical. Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) emphasize the relevance of ﬁnancial constraints (capital-market
imperfections) for imperfectly competitive ﬁrms to compete less aggressively during recessions and for the resulting
countercyclical markups of price over marginal cost. However, Bloch and Olive (2001) point out that the empirical
results related to markup cyclicality in manufacturing are mixed.
2One clear obstacle is that these ﬁnancial markups in the banking sector cannot be stringently interpreted as ﬁnance
premiums faced by ﬁrms and households.
3Generally, one expects a ﬁnancial accelerator to emerge with banks maximizing proﬁts in the short term by providing
ample credit during economic upturns. At the same time, loan markups go down because of increasing competition
between banks and the procyclical value of collateral additionally increases credit demand (Braumann 2004).
4However the term “interest spread” is used for two diﬀerent measures. On the one hand, diﬀerences between
contractual or posted interest rates (e.g. gaps between speciﬁc bank lending and deposit rates) are called spreads. On
the other hand, “spreads” are also calculated (ex post) from balance sheet and income statement data. Throughout
this paper, measures which fall in the latter category will be used. In referring to contractual or posted rates, the term
“interest rate diﬀerential”will be used to avoid confusion.
5An increase in eﬃciency and a therefore possible decrease of margins and spreads may be induced e.g. by more
competition within the banking sector. Such changes in margins (spreads) do not indicate changes in bank eﬃciency
if they are due to, for example, changes in taxation or in the loan default rate (Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga 1999).
6Monopolistic as well as oligopolistic versions of the micro-model of the banking ﬁrm can also be found in Freixas
and Rochet (1997) or Corvoisier and Gropp (2002).
7Annual bank-level data for 80 countries (developed and developing countries from all continents) from 1988 to
1995 are analyzed by Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt and Huizinga (1999). Banks from ﬁve major EU countries (France, Germany,
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) are featured in the data sets of Goddard et al. (2004) (1992-1998) and Maudos
and de Guevara (2004) (1993-2000). This set of countries is enlarged (with data from Switzerland and the USA) by
Saunders and Schumacher (2000), whose sample period starts in 1988 and ends in 1995. Drakos (2003) utilizes panel
data for banks from 11 Central and Eastern European countries (1993-1999), and about 300 U.S. banks are in the data
set of Angbazo (1997) (1989-1993). Brock and Rojas-Suarez (2000) analyze quarterly bank-level data from six Latin
American countries from the 1990s.
8The most comprehensive list of countries appears in Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004), where data averaged over the
period from 1995 to 1999 are examined for a cross-section of 72 countries. Panel data for the euro area countries
appears in Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) (1993-1999), and Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003) apply panel data from 19, mostly
European, industrial countries (1993-1998).
9Goddard et al. (2004) also control for the industry Herﬁndahl, which has a positive inﬂuence on the ROE.
10Domestic banks also report the relevant data for their (foreign) branches, but not for e.g. aﬃliated (foreign) banks
in which they have stakes. This refers to the balance sheet as well as to the income statement data. Therefore, the
assets and proﬁts of the foreign banks acquired in the past are not in the data, but the business with them is (e.g.
claims against them).
11The Austrian banking laws had to be harmonized with the standards of the European Union (EU). The whole
process has spurred competition and concentration, and improved eﬃciency in the banking sectors of the EU (Bikker
and Groeneveld 2000).
2412The calculation of the total spread also requires the deﬁnition of the interest-bearing liabilities. These, in our case,
include interbank liabilities, deposits from non-banks and the banking sector’s issues of secured debt. The diﬀering
maturity of (and maturity structure across diﬀerent types of) assets and liabilities was not considered in the calculation
of interest margins and spreads.
13Subordinated debt is included, whereas undisclosed reserves do not appear in the balance sheet. The latter, however,
account for a large fraction of tier 2 capital.
14The interest margins and spreads, as well as the proﬁtability measures (ROE and ROA), appear to be very small.
This stems from the (non-)interest income and proﬁt ﬁgures in the respective numerators being quarterly levels (of ﬂow
variables) divided by stocks from the balance sheet.
15Some of the variables listed in the review of the empirical literature are not used in this paper for the following
speciﬁc reasons. No quarterly data for a quite long time period is available for taxes and loan loss provisions. For
both variables, only a quarterly preview for the whole year (including already charged-oﬀ loans and, respectively, pre-
paid taxes) would be available from 1996 on. Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003) are followed in not including a variable for
implicit interest payments. As argued by them, there has been a trend towards explicit pricing of banking services,
as implicit interest payments have been eroded by deregulation, technological advances and increased competition.
However, accounting for non-interest income (as will be done in our regressions) amounts to using quite a similar
variable. Several arguments exist that lead us to not account for the importance of the banking sector (besides the one
that other variables used might also proxy for or be a product of the disintermediation trend). The banking sector’s
total assets divided by GDP do not show a disintermediation trend as they rise over time. The volume of outstanding
credit (relative to GDP) is ignored because loans (their share in total assets) will be used as a potential determinant
of margins and proﬁtability. Among others, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004) are in favor of stock market capitalization
relative to real GDP as a measure for competition from other segments of the ﬁnancial system. But the problem is that
(also with the Austrian data) stock market developments are largely price-driven. Additionally, there is evidence from
the literature that, to a certain extent, bank and stock market ﬁnance might be complements rather than substitutes.
What would be needed is something like the share of new loans in the total of new bond, share and private equity
(venture capital) issues as well as new loans, for the corporate sector only (no government bonds, for example), on
a quarterly level, for a fairly long time period. Besides the fact that this data is unavailable, such a measure would,
again, only tell half the story, because the changing importance of the banking sector also with respect to deposits and
ﬁnancial investments should be accounted for. A measure like the total assets of investment (mutual) funds relative
to deposits at banks would, as it is sharply rising over time, overrate the disintermediation trend. Finally, the inﬂation
rate is assumed to be captured with the inclusion of nominal interest rates (as well as interest rate volatility), so that
degrees of freedom can be saved.
16Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004) argue that concentration measures reﬂect many factors such as regulatory restrictions,
eﬃciency, market power, etc. In their study, the eﬀect of concentration on net interest margins disappears when proxies
for regulation issues are included.
17These are methods which do not use information on the structure of the banking market (and are therefore called
non-structural approaches). Bikker and Groeneveld (2000), Bikker and Haaf (2002) or Weill (2004) calculate the
so-called Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, Bikker (2003) uses the Bresnahan-Lau method to determine the degree of market
power of the average bank. However, we cannot follow these methods. Both approaches would require bank level
data, which are not available to us up to the necessary extent, for calculating competition time series. Nevertheless,
some comments on the results for Austria in these studies are potentially relevant in our interpretation of concentration
eﬀects. Weill (2004), for example, ﬁnds that the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic for Austria decreased between 1994 and
1999, which suggests reduced competition (the statistic is farther away from its value for perfect competition). This is
not suited to the presumed eﬀects of deregulation and liberalization, but to the subsequent reactions of the Austrian
banking sector. Banks were increasingly shifting abroad (into CEE, but also EU countries), which is evident in the
development of the concentration ratio. As mainly the larger banks expanded abroad, the concentration ratio rose from
25about 54 to 59 percent between 1994 and 2000. Weill (2004) also speaks of trends that lead both competition and
concentration to rise in this period. The expected single currency and cross-border mergers forced banks to improve
eﬃciency and to gain market shares to create barriers to entry. This does not mean that the EU did not succeed in
spurring banking competition (see the improved eﬃciency), but that certain trends and expectations induced reactions
in the banking sectors that prevented the increased competitive behaviour to show up in lower concentration ratios and
higher H-statistics. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) suppose that the eﬀects of deregulation and liberalization policies and
of increasing concentration on competition have partly oﬀset each other. Bikker and Groeneveld (2000), on the other
hand, based on a simple regression for 1995 (for 15 countries including Austria), report a negative relation between
the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the top 5 concentration ratio. This means that higher (national) concentration is
accompanied by less competitive behaviour. As these considerations may imply diﬀerent and changing relations between
competition and concentration, interpreting any relations between the concentration ratio and, for example, interest
margins must be undertaken cautiously. Gischer and J¨ uttner (2003), however, argue that n-bank concentration ratios
are unsuitable to measure market power when dealing with global competition.
18For questions related to the equity capital data see the description of the return on equity. The relation to the
regulatory capital requirements measures (which are only available to us from 1998 on) is that the equity ratios used
in that respect include supplementary capital (tier 2 capital) in the numerator and divide by risk-weighted assets.
Therefore, our equity ratios will be considerably smaller than the ones published and interpreted when capital adequacy
is discussed.
19Potential endogeneity of explanatory variables is an issue which is typically ignored in existing empirical work on
the determinants of net interest margins.
20Equation (2) actually corresponds to a speciﬁcation with interactions or, in technical terms, to a threshold model
with ∆GROWTH as the threshold variable. The threshold value is implicitly zero, and diﬀerent intercepts and slopes
in diﬀerent regimes are allowed for.
21This result also emerges if we use the level of GDP instead of GDP growth.
22As mentioned before, the choice of the lag structure is based on the Schwarz information criterion, but also the
Hannan-Quinn criterion almost in every case leads us to choose 1 lag. The balance sheet total of the previous quarter
is included as an exogenous variable, but treating it as being endogenously determined does not qualitatively change
our results. Additionally, we allow for shifts in the constant term at the beginning of 1994 and 1998. The VAR model
for the return on equity (ROE) does not contain the equity ratio, and the one for the non-interest margin does not
contain the share of non-interest income in total operating income.
23The results also illustrate that, in alternative variable orders, some of the measures which appear after openness
here, feed back into it contemporaneously. In these exercises, we also observe that between all balance-sheet-related
variables, feedback relations are not unplausible. However, some alternative setups were examined, but the responses
of interest (those of net interest margins, spreads and proﬁtability) were not largely aﬀected by changes in the variable
ordering.
24Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) come to a similar conclusion for the Italian banking sector. They ﬁnd a positive
relation between concentration and competition, which is not consistent with the structure performance hypothesis.
Italian banks mainly reacted to the threat of entry (made possible by implementation of the Single Banking License)
with consolidation and restructuring. Parts of the achieved eﬃciency gains were passed on to customers, so falling
margins and more competition can be observed alongside increasing concentration.
25If we include the operating-expense ratio besides the CIR, margins and proﬁt measures respond negatively to both.
26The result is in line with the cross-sectional results of, for example, Demirg¨ u¸ c-Kunt et al. (2004) who also ﬁnd
that GDP growth is negatively associated with net interest margins. By Maudos and de Guevara (2004), GDP growth
is seen as a proxy for possible cost reductions and therefore higher growth generates lower margins.
2627Certain often-proposed explanations for countercyclicality are therefore also precluded if applied to the lending-
deposit rate diﬀerential. One is the argument that favorable economic conditions are associated with lower credit risk
and increased value of collateral, and a second argues that the competition for loans among banks increases in an
economic upturn and hence banks reduce“margins”to protect their market share.
28The argument here is not solely a probably rising competition within the banking sector, but a procyclical rivalry
between diﬀerent sources of corporate ﬁnance. For example, the determinants of share issues (stock prices, etc.) vary
with the business cycle.
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31B Tables
Table 1: Shares in the total banking sector balance sheeta
Assets 1990 1995 2000 2005
Cash and central bank balances 1.7 1.6 1.1 0.9
Domestic interbank claims 17.7 16.3 17.7 15.4
Loans to domestic non-banks 43.4 45.1 38.7 37.3
Domestic securities and participations 11.7 12.7 12.1 10.9
Foreign interbank claims 15.5 13.4 10.2 11.4
Loans to foreign non-banks 5.6 5.0 7.7 8.5
Foreign securities and participations 1.6 2.5 9.2 12.4
Liabilities 1990 1995 2000 2005
Domestic interbank liabilities 18.4 17.4 19.1 17.3
Domestic non-bank deposits 36.7 38.4 31.0 31.6
Domestic issues of secured debt 11.9 13.1 11.2 11.2
Domestic equity capital 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.9
Foreign interbank liabilities 15.2 12.0 16.0 12.7
Foreign non-bank deposits 4.0 5.2 5.2 4.6
Foreign issues of secured debt 5.5 4.8 9.1 12.9
Foreign equity capital 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4
Balance steet total (billions of euros) 291.6 379.4 561.9 677.6
a Calculations are based on averages of the reported monthly (end-of-month) stocks. Figures for 2005 comprise
the period from January to June only.
32Table 2: Shares of proﬁt and loss accounts items in total operating income
Item
a 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Staﬀ costs 36.6 36.1 33.8
Administrative expenses 18.3 21.2 22.2
Operating proﬁt 32.0 30.9 32.3
Net interest income 59.9 56.3 50.4
Income from securities and participations 7.1 8.8 13.4
Net fee-based income (fees and commissions) 16.3 19.2 22.7
Item
b 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2004
Interest expenses 66.0 57.0 53.0
Fee-based expenses (fees and commissions) 1.4 2.2 3.4
Staﬀ costs 11.9 14.7 14.7
Administrative expenses 5.9 8.6 9.7
Operating proﬁt 10.4 12.6 14.1
Interest income 85.5 79.9 75.0
Income from securities and participations 2.3 3.6 5.9
Fee-based income (fees and commissions) 6.8 10.1 13.3
a Total operating income consists, according to standard calculation routines, of net interest income,
income from securities and participations, net fee-based income, net proﬁt or loss on ﬁnancial opera-
tions and other operating income. The expenses side then reduces to staﬀ and general administrative
expenses, depreciation and other operating expenses. Operating proﬁt (before-tax) corresponds to
total operating income (as deﬁned above) less these expenses.
b In this part of the table, interest and fee-based expenses are explicitly part of the expenses, and also
are not deducted from the respective income ﬁgures in the calculation of total operating income.
33Table 3: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Net interest margin (TA) 0.371 0.063 0.259 0.493
Net interest margin (IEA) 0.409 0.069 0.299 0.539
Net interest spread 0.417 0.076 0.299 0.551
Net interest spread (non-banks) 0.737 0.143 0.482 0.944
Return on equity (ROE) 4.792 1.293 3.210 8.720
Return on assets (ROA) 0.211 0.036 0.150 0.325
Non-interest margin 0.280 0.048 0.151 0.386
Bond yield 5.83 1.74 2.92 8.94
GDP growth 2.29 1.38 -0.65 4.65
S.D. of bond yield 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.29
Openness 51.07 6.08 42.98 64.04
Concentration ratio 55.87 1.40 53.75 59.09
Equity ratio 4.52 0.55 3.17 5.29
Loans ratio 48.59 2.10 44.85 52.49
Cash ratio 1.41 0.30 0.82 1.78
Non-interest income (share in total) 43.14 6.91 25.47 53.51
Cost-income ratio 67.68 3.93 54.14 76.77
34Table 4: Cyclicality in bivariate models with either bond yield or growtha
R e s p o n s e s t o s h o c k s i n t h e b o n d y i e l d 01248
Net interest margin (TA) -0.013 -0.008 -0.003 0.010 0.022 *
Net interest margin (IEA) -0.011 -0.007 0.000 0.015 0.027 *
Net interest spread -0.004 -0.002 0.006 0.021 * 0.033 *
Net interest spread (non-banks) -0.003 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.008
Return on equity (ROE) -0.847 * -0.590 * -0.484 * -0.253 -0.050
Return on assets (ROA) -0.035 * -0.025 * -0.012 0.001 0.004
Non-interest margin -0.024 -0.010 -0.008 -0.002 -0.001
Responses to shocks in GDP growth
Net interest margin (TA) -0.002 -0.006 * -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
Net interest margin (IEA) -0.002 -0.007 * -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
Net interest spread -0.002 -0.006 * -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
Net interest spread (non-banks) -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.003
Return on equity (ROE) -0.125 -0.244 * -0.193 * -0.091 * -0.020
Return on assets (ROA) -0.004 -0.009 * -0.006 * -0.003 * -0.001
Non-interest margin 0.007 0.002 0.000 -0.001 0.000
a The number of lags for these bivarate vector autoregressions was chosen according to the suggestions of the Schwarz
information criterion. With the bond yield, the VAR order typically is two. With the growth rate of real GDP it is two
for the ﬁrst three margins (spreads), and one in the remaining cases.
Table 5: Asymmetry of ROA responses in the bivariate model with GDP growtha
R e s p o n s e s t o s h o c k s i n G D P g r o w t h01248
Symmetric model -0.004 -0.009 * -0.006 * -0.003 * -0.001
Asymmetric model (GDP growth rises) -0.005 -0.013 * -0.009 * -0.004 * -0.001
Asymmetric model (GDP growth falls) -0.004 -0.007 -0.004 -0.002 0.000
a The asymmetric model is speciﬁed as in Equation (2).
35Table 6: Responses of the net interest margin (TA)
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield -0.006 0.006 0.013 0.009 0.002
Openness -0.005 * -0.004 -0.005 * -0.006 * -0.007 *
Concentration ratio -0.007 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006
Equity ratio -0.012 -0.093 * -0.044 -0.006 0.052
Loans ratio -0.005 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.012
Cash ratio 0.035 0.026 0.011 0.015 0.021
Non-interest income -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Cost-income ratio -0.004 * -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bond yield -0.021 * -0.003 0.002 0.006 0.008
GDP growth -0.002 -0.009 * -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
Table 7: Responses of the net interest margin (IEA)
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield -0.006 0.018 0.015 0.012 0.004
Openness -0.006 * -0.005 * -0.007 * -0.008 * -0.009 *
Concentration ratio -0.009 -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009
Equity ratio -0.031 -0.098 * -0.052 -0.005 0.063
Loans ratio -0.007 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.015
Cash ratio 0.048 0.035 0.016 0.021 0.028
Non-interest income -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Cost-income ratio -0.004 * -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
Bond yield -0.022 * -0.003 0.003 0.007 0.008
GDP growth -0.003 -0.010 * -0.006 * -0.003 -0.003
36Table 8: Responses of the net interest spread
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield -0.002 0.041 0.012 0.015 0.004
Openness -0.006 * -0.007 * -0.008 * -0.009 * -0.010
Concentration ratio -0.010 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.012
Equity ratio -0.064 -0.093 * -0.060 -0.005 0.066
Loans ratio -0.006 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.017
Cash ratio 0.068 * 0.036 0.024 0.027 0.034
Non-interest income -0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
Cost-income ratio -0.003 * -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bond yield -0.018 -0.004 0.003 0.007 0.007
GDP growth -0.005 -0.011 * -0.007 * -0.004 -0.003
Table 9: Responses of the net interest spread (non-banks)
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield -0.111 -0.027 0.000 -0.003 -0.009
Openness -0.012 * -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.009
Concentration ratio -0.006 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.006
Equity ratio -0.060 -0.123 -0.073 -0.023 0.009
Loans ratio -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.004 0.012
Cash ratio 0.021 0.065 0.032 0.025 0.029
Non-interest income 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001
Cost-income ratio -0.004 * -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
Bond yield -0.013 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.005
GDP growth -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003 -0.002
37Table 10: Responses of the return on equity (ROE)
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield 0.531 1.404 0.520 0.534 0.502
Openness 0.036 0.012 -0.004 -0.023 -0.040
Concentration ratio -0.022 0.086 0.112 0.088 0.010
Loans ratio -0.150 -0.222 -0.266 -0.270 -0.223
Cash ratio -0.135 -0.333 -0.094 0.033 0.123
Non-interest income 0.008 -0.022 -0.008 -0.002 0.001
Cost-income ratio -0.210 * -0.059 * -0.038 * -0.022 -0.016
Bond yield -1.001 * -0.483 -0.342 -0.245 -0.129
GDP growth -0.046 -0.221 * -0.131 -0.073 -0.046
Table 11: Responses of the return on assets (ROA)
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield 0.026 0.048 0.006 0.011 0.010
Openness -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
Concentration ratio -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002
Equity ratio -0.078 -0.066 -0.054 -0.022 -0.012
Loans ratio -0.007 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001
Cash ratio 0.003 -0.011 -0.005 0.003 0.008
Non-interest income 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Cost-income ratio -0.009 * -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bond yield -0.037 * -0.014 -0.009 -0.001 0.003
GDP growth -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001
38Table 12: Responses of the non-interest margin
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield 0.060 0.021 -0.016 -0.026 -0.030
Openness 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
Concentration ratio 0.009 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.005
Equity ratio 0.012 0.103 0.097 0.062 -0.006
Loans ratio 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.008 0.002
Cash ratio 0.013 -0.042 -0.025 -0.016 -0.020
Cost-income ratio -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Bond yield -0.018 -0.012 -0.004 -0.001 0.000
GDP growth 0.009 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.004
Table 13: Responses of the net interest income
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield -59.588 18.983 -55.446 -92.224 -114.850
Openness -5.818 -11.818 -13.198 * -12.602 -7.857
Concentration ratio -11.835 4.032 7.830 11.202 8.571
Equity capital 0.040 -0.005 -0.012 -0.003 0.043
Loans 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.009 * 0.009
Cash 0.028 -0.001 0.002 0.005 0.007
Non-interest income 0.166 -0.052 0.032 0.038 0.047
Operating expenses -0.107 -0.181 -0.046 0.024 0.035
Bond yield -68.729 * -22.467 0.235 24.973 45.133
GDP growth -2.596 -29.642 * -11.471 -1.890 4.701
39Table 14: Responses of the operating proﬁt
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield -40.015 195.178 26.416 9.706 -32.421
Openness 12.842 -9.026 -9.022 -6.953 -4.140
Concentration ratio 3.222 7.812 3.989 1.455 -0.300
Equity capital 0.102 0.014 0.003 0.008 0.022
Loans 0.019 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.003
Cash 0.020 -0.040 -0.010 0.003 0.005
Bond yield -115.516 * -43.453 -24.720 -13.651 0.107
GDP growth -3.088 -23.372 -9.931 -2.558 0.476
Table 15: Responses of the non-interest income
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield -30.338 124.210 -106.492 -26.706 21.946
Openness 26.573 * -0.844 6.885 6.740 5.028
Concentration ratio 26.081 20.343 14.199 6.628 0.211
Equity capital 0.015 0.040 0.039 0.024 0.000
Loans 0.028 * 0.006 0.004 0.000 -0.002
Cash -0.003 -0.040 -0.004 0.000 -0.002
Operating expenses 0.254 * 0.216 0.036 -0.004 -0.009
Bond yield -38.955 8.209 5.082 2.815 -13.126
GDP growth 13.524 18.878 8.322 6.797 1.453
40Table 16: Responses of the net interest income from non-banks
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
S.D. of bond yield -416.311 * -363.287 -282.523 -225.135 -232.876
Openness -18.650 -5.274 -6.200 -11.889 -21.114
Concentration ratio 12.640 29.907 39.580 41.318 31.954
Equity capital 0.008 -0.033 -0.038 -0.037 -0.013
Loans 0.018 * 0.019 * 0.016 * 0.012 0.011
Cash -0.007 0.003 -0.001 0.001 0.007
Non-interest income -0.115 0.006 -0.014 0.004 0.021
Operating expenses -0.323 * -0.138 -0.167 -0.146 -0.137
Table 17: Responses of the net interest income from non-banks (full model)
A f t e r q u a r t e r 01248
Bond yield -10.405 50.585 81.798 * 85.030 * 69.369
GDP growth -1.567 6.018 16.168 13.562 0.949
S.D. of bond yield -261.467 -178.231 -21.970 23.326 37.309
Openness -14.173 3.290 2.026 -1.646 -9.906
Concentration ratio 11.464 46.841 * 52.391 * 40.021 19.118
Equity capital 0.019 -0.019 -0.031 -0.053 -0.029
Loans 0.014 0.019 * 0.010 0.006 0.003
Cash -0.013 -0.005 -0.009 -0.004 0.003
Non-interest income -0.063 0.157 0.012 0.031 0.037
Operating expenses -0.332 * 0.039 -0.130 -0.106 -0.040
41C Description of the data
Data on proﬁt and loss account items for the banking sector comes from quarterly bank reports, balance sheet data
from monthly balance sheet reports (almost all banks operating in Austria report on the legal basis of the Austrian
Banking Act). Balance sheet items are quarterly averages of monthly (of three end-of-month) ﬁgures and, as the items
from the income statement, in millions of euros. In general (exceptions as indicated), the data source is the Austrian
Central Bank (the Oesterreichische Nationalbank, OeNB), and the sample period ranges from the ﬁrst quarter of 1987
to the second quarter of 2005 (74 observations).
C.1 Bank performance measures
Net interest margin (TA) Net interest income (interest income less interest expense) divided by total assets
(percentage).
Net interest margin (IEA) Net interest income divided by interest-earning assets (percentage).
Net interest spread Interest income divided by interest-earning assets less interest expense divided by
interest-bearing liabilities (percentage).
Net interest spread (non-banks) Interest income earned from loans to non-banks divided by total loans to non-
banks less the interest expenses paid on deposits from non-banks divided by total
demand, time and savings deposits from non-banks (percentage). Data on interest
income and expenses are available since the ﬁrst quarter of 1989 (66 observations).
Return on equity (ROE) Operating proﬁt (before-tax) divided by equity capital (percentage).
Return on assets (ROA) Operating proﬁt (before-tax) divided by total assets (percentage).
Non-interest margin Non-interest income divided by total assets (percentage).
C.2 Explanatory and control variables
Secondary market yield of bonds Average yield for all (ﬁxed-interest) bonds listed at the Austrian Stock Exchange
with more than one year to maturity. Quarterly averages of daily yields. Data
source: OEKB (Oesterreichische Kontrollbank).
Growth rate of real GDP Growth rate of real GDP (quarterly level) relative to real GDP four quarters ago
(percentage). GDP data source: WIFO (Austrian Institute of Economic Research).
Standard deviation of bond yields Standard deviation of daily bond yields of the respective quarter.
Banking sector openness Foreign assets plus foreign liabilities of the banking sector divided by total assets
(percentage).
Concentration ratio Share of the 10 largest banks’ assets in the balance sheet total of the banking
sector (percentage).
Equity ratio Share of the book value of equity capital in the balance sheet total (percentage).
Loans ratio Share of loans (claims to domestic and foreign non-banks, in domestic as well as
foreign currency) in banking sector assets (percentage).
Cash ratio Share of cash and central bank balances in total banking sector assets (percentage).
Non-interest income Share of non-interest income in total operating income (percentage).
Cost-income ratio (CIR) Operating expenses divided by operating income (percentage).
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